


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12 September 1959

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CENTRAL

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BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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12 September 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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*Communist China - India: The session of the standing committee of Communist China's National People's Congress which convened on 11 September became a forum for countering "the anti-China campaign" launched in the Indian Parliament over the Sino-Indian border dispute. In his speech to the session, Chou En-lai again called for "friendly negotiations," but complained that India has "resorted to force to back up its demand." The speakers following Chou have taken a stronger line and thus set the tone for a major propaganda effort to justify Peiping's own territorial claims. Nehru on 11 September welcomed Moscow's "far and unusual" statement calling for both sides to resolve their differences through friendly discussions. The Indian prime minister will be irritated by Chou's most recent remarks.

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HO
USSR-Morocco: (The Soviet chargé in Rabat has been approaching the defense minister "almost daily" with offers of Soviet arms of "any and all types," according to a high Moroccan official. While Rabat is probably relaying information on the Soviet offers in order to hasten US consideration of Moroccan requests for arms, Ambassador Yost feels that Morocco is "perfectly capable" of turning to the USSR to obtain arms. Soviet officials have also recently extended offers of economic and technical assistance.)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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France-Laos: (Paris feels that internal political difficulties in Laos have provided a favorable climate for Communist subversion which in turn has caused cries of alarm from the "inept" Laotian Army. This estimate is backed by French officials in Vientiane who, while admitting the seriousness of the situation, tend to obscure this fact by criticizing individual Laotian military reports as exaggerated. Foreign Ministry spokesmen approve the UN mission because this will strengthen Laotian morale and buy time for domestic reform)

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Pakistan: President Ayub has made a new effort to sell himself and his government to the people of East Pakistan by conducting a whistle-stop tour through the province between 1 and 7 September. Ayub's effort was only moderately successful, as shown by the undemonstrative though relatively large crowds which greeted him during his tour. East Pakistanis apparently still regard Ayub's regime as their best hope for good government, and there are no indications of efforts to oppose his regime. In both East and West Pakistan, however, the government is somewhat less popular than it was earlier.

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12 Sept 59

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Chou En-lai Charges Indians with Responsibility for Tension On Border

The Standing Committee of Communist China's National Congress on 11 September became a forum for countering charges of Chinese aggression hurled in the Indian Parliament over the Sino-Indian border dispute. Keynoting what is apparently to be a major propaganda campaign on the border issue, Premier Chou En-lai told the Committee that "differences should be resolved through friendly negotiation" but that "recent tension had been entirely and deliberately created by some Indians who, with ulterior motives, made use of some boundary disputes to launch a new anti-Chinese campaign." Chou said the Indian Government tried to seize this opportunity to pressure Peiping into accepting Indian claims.

Taking their cue from Chou, following speakers also called for negotiations but, in much stronger terms, attempted to justify the legality of Peiping's own claims and criticized both the Indian government and Prime Minister Nehru. "Mr. Nehru," one speaker said, "slanders China." Another spokesman warned India to "halt on the brink of the precipice." The tenor of the statements suggests that Peiping will maintain a rigid attitude in any negotiations. "We will never accept the so-called McMahon line," said one speaker.

Nehru on 11 September welcomed Moscow's "fair and unusual" statement calling for both sides to resolve their differences through friendly discussions. The Indian Prime Minister, however, will be irritated by these remarks in the Standing Committee. Commenting on Chou's 8 September charge that India was following British "imperialism," Nehru testily asked how Communist China got so big if it were not for "imperialism" under earlier regimes.

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Soviet Arms Offers to Morocco

(The Soviet chargé in Rabat has been approaching the Moroccan defense minister "almost daily" with offers of Soviet arms of "any and all types" to be paid for over a period of twenty years at no interest, according to Moroccan Security Director Laghzaoui. Laghzaoui commented that Moscow is aware of Morocco's negotiations for US military equipment and hopes to "get its foot in the door," particularly in order to send military technicians to Morocco.)

(Rabat is probably relaying this information to hasten consideration by Washington of its requests for arms. Nonetheless, Ambassador Yost feels that Morocco is "perfectly capable" of turning to the USSR if the United States and France fail to supply certain equipment, such as tanks, which Rabat especially desires.)

(Evidence has been accumulating since early August that Soviet officials have also offered Morocco technical and economic assistance ranging from a large-scale credit for goods to small amounts of aid to meet specific needs in such fields as medicine and public health. Moscow apparently hopes that its offers will encourage Rabat to take a stiffer stand in its effort to reach an understanding with France on economic matters, and to exert increased pressure for evacuation of Western forces--particularly US air bases--from its territory.)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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France Minimizes Military Threat to Laos

(The French Government remains skeptical of the seriousness of the military threat facing Laos, and feels that the problem is an internal political one caused by the failings of the Laotian Government which have created a favorable climate for Communist subversion. The Laotian Army, according to Paris, is unable to cope with the situation and has exaggerated the scope of outside intervention in a deliberate effort to conceal its own ineptitude.)

(While France approves the UN fact-finder mission to Laos on the ground that this will have a calming effect, strengthen Laotian morale, and buy time for domestic reforms, it opposes direct involvement of SEATO in Laos on the ground that this might precipitate a "Communist military reaction." The French argue that SEATO should follow events carefully from Bangkok, but not send a fact-finding team to Laos. Foreign Minister Couvé de Murville is described as being "completely negative" toward any SEATO involvement at this time.)

(Paris' attitude is no doubt influenced by French representatives in Vientiane who, while admitting the general seriousness of the situation, nevertheless tend to blur its basic dangers by accusing the Laotian Army of specific instances of fallacious reporting. During a recent exchange of views between the American ambassador and army attaché and their French counterparts, the French military attaché in a lengthy presentation sought to refute numerous details of Laotian army briefings about the fighting and the degree of North Vietnamese involvement.)

(The 10 September Foreign Ministry inquiries as to "what the US has in mind" in taking standby military precautions suggest an effort by Paris to exploit the Laotian situation in the context of De Gaulle's continued insistence on closer US-UK-French policy and strategy coordination throughout the world.)

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Pakistani Military Government Still Acceptable
To East Pakistan

East Pakistan, widely expected eventually to present the military regime in Karachi with its first substantial opposition, apparently continues to accept President Ayub and his government. Large crowds gave Ayub a moderately favorable reception during his tour of that province from 1 to 7 September.

Ayub's visit was intended to demonstrate his government's interest in East Pakistan. The people of that province, generally more politically conscious than those in West Pakistan, since the creation of Pakistan in 1947 have resented the domination of the government by powerful groups in West Pakistan. The military government, backed by the predominantly West Pakistani army, therefore considers that it has special problems in East Pakistan.

Although the military regime's popularity has abated somewhat in both East and West Pakistan since its early days following the army take-over in October 1958, the East Pakistanis apparently still regard the Ayub government as offering the best hope for honest government and for solutions to such chronic problems as high food prices and unemployment. Many regret the withdrawal of Pakistan's highly respected army from the direct administration of the provincial government, since the civil service remains widely distrusted.

Ayub told an audience in Dacca that in his meeting with India's Prime Minister Nehru on 1 September he had stressed the need to solve the disputes between India and Pakistan. This would enable both countries to reduce their defense forces and their reliance on others for help. According to Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir, Ayub also emphasized to Nehru that invaders historically had been attracted to the subcontinent when it was divided, and that India and Pakistan must be prepared to join in its defense. 25X1

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